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6 Correspondence versus Autonomy in 
the Language of Understanding 
Human Action
Kenneth J. Gergen
Some years ago, I became absorbed with the problem of historicity 
in human action. There seemed good reason to contend that pat­
terns of human conduct are subject to continuous alteration across 
time. If this assumption is justified, certain limits seemed to be 
placed over the capacity of the sociobehavioral sciences to accumu­
late knowledge in the traditional sense (Gergen 1973, 1978a, 1982). 
Although continued attention to this problem is surely warranted 
(see especially chaps. 2 and 4, this volume), it is to another related 
set of issues that I shall address my remarks. During the course of 
studying the historicity problem, I became increasingly struck with 
what appeared to be a very loose relationship between language 
and the patterns of conduct to which language ostensibly refers. 
Commonly we take the language of social description to stand in 
some roughly correspondent relationship to discriminable patterns 
of action. Thus, whether in science or daily life, description is as­
sumed to be informative about actions independent of it. Yet com­
mon experience provides numerous instances in which such 
assumptions are contradicted. For example, an individual might be 
described as “intelligent,” “warm,” or “depressed,” and all the 
while his bodily movements are undergoing continuous alteration. 
His actions are protean, elastic, multiplicitous, but the description 
remains static. Similar discrepancies can be discerned on the pro­
fessional level. In psychoanalysis, for example, practitioners dem­
onstrate an uncanny ability to apply a restricted descriptive 
vocabulary to an immense range of life patterns. Regardless of the 
vicissitudes of one’s life trajectory, for analytic purposes, it can be 
characterized by a relatively narrow range of descriptors. If one 
turns to the psychological laboratory, one continues to find investi­
gators capable of retaining a given theoretical account regardless of
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the range of data brought to bear. I can think of no psychological 
theory that has yet been abandoned for reasons of clear observa­
tional challenge.
The concern of this chapter, then, is the problem of the rela­
tionship between descriptive language and the world it is designed 
to represent. The problem is of no small consequence, for as phi­
losophers of science have long been aware, it is primarily in the 
degree to which there is correspondence between theoretical lan­
guage and real-world events that scientific theory acquires utility in 
the market of prediction and control. If scientific language bears 
no determinate relationship to events external to the language it­
self, not only does its contribution to prediction and control be­
come problematic, but scientific theory becomes closed to 
improvement through observation. The hope that knowledge may 
be advanced through continued, systematic observation is ren­
dered problematic. More generally, one would be moved to ques­
tion the fundamental objectivity of scientific accounts. If such 
accounts are not grounded in observation, then what furnishes 
their warrant? The question is critical as it is this claim to objectivity 
that has furnished the chief basis for the broad authority claimed 
by the sciences over the past century.
It is in these many respects that early philosophers of science 
have been keen to establish a close relationship between language 
and observation. At the heart of the logical positivist movement, 
for example, lay the “verifiability principle of meaning”; to wit, the 
meaning of a proposition rests on its capacity for verification 
through observation. As it was argued, propositions not open to 
corroboration or emendation through observation are unworthy of 
further disputation. The problem was, however, to account for the 
connection between propositions and observations. Schlick (1934) 
argued that the meaning of single words within propositions must 
be established through ostensive (“pointing to”) means. In his early 
work, Carnap (1928) proposed that thing-predicates represented 
“primitive ideas,” thus reducing scientific propositions to reports 
of private experience. For Neurath (1932), propositions were to be 
verified though “protocol sentences,” which were themselves to re­
fer to the biological processes of perception. As all such statements 
are thus reducible to the language of physics, Neurath argued, 
there was a fundamental unity among all branches of science. From 
yet another vantage point, Russell (1924) proposed that objective 
knowledge could be reduced to sets of “atomic propositions,” the 
truth of which would rest on isolated and discriminable facts.
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Yet such attempts to establish secure and determinate rela­
tionships between words and real-world referents eventually came 
under heavy attack. Were the propositions entering into the ver­
ifiability principle themselves subject to verification? If not, in what 
sense were they meaningful? Propositions appear to have meaning 
over and above the referential capacity of the words that make 
them up. How is such meaning to be understood? Are propositions 
subject to verification, or only single terms? Is verification a state of 
mind, and if so, in what sense are states of mind themselves verifia­
ble? On what grounds are the basic facts to which descriptors refer 
to be established? How can rules for linking predicates with partic­
ulars be constructed when the terms of the rules themselves remain 
meaningless until defined by further linking rules? These and 
other nettlesome questions have remained recalcitrant to a broadly 
compelling solution. Today it is generally agreed that the manner 
in which objectivity in meaning is achieved, along with a specifica­
tion of the rules for when it is not, remains unsatisfactorily explica­
ted (cf. Fuller 1983; Barnes 1982).
At the same time, other lines of argumentation have been 
emerging, the implications of which are substantial. In each of 
these cases, a significant question has been raised concerning the 
relationship between word and object, or theory and evidence. In 
each case, the arguments grant such substantial autonomy to the­
oretical discourse that major revisions seem demanded in the tradi­
tional account of science. Certain of these arguments are of 
particular significance to the formulation of metatheory for the 
sociobehavioral sciences. They emerge from differing (although 
sometimes congenial) intellectual contexts, and their contours are 
not always distinguishable. Thus I will initially attempt to bring 
four of these positions into clear focus. After examining the im­
plications of these arguments for the sciences more generally, we 
can move to consider a variety of major functions to be fulfilled by 
theories of human action.
The Contextual Dependency of Meaning 
The initial line of argument is one that has wended its way through 
several philosophic debates and has subsequently had a marked 
impact on microsociological thought. As we have seen from the 
logical empiricist perspective, critical descriptive terms at the the­
oretical level should correspond to specifiable or delimited obser­
vations. The ideal situation would be one in which discrete 
particulars at the level of observation would stand in a one-to-one
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relationship with mathematical integers at the theoretical level. 
The attempt of correspondence theorists is thus to establish foun­
dations of knowledge that are context free. That is, the linkage 
between theoretical terms and observations (or the objective mean­
ing of propositions) should remain stable across varying contexts 
both at the theoretical and at the observational level. If context 
invariance is not maintained, then the potential for scientific prog­
nostication is severely threatened; one would be unable to specify 
what facts would be predicted by the theory as theoretical and his­
torical contexts were altered. The possibility for empirical test is 
further impugned because one would be unable to specify what 
observations would count as confirmations or disconflrmations of a 
theory across varying contexts.
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations was one of the first sig­
nificant works to challenge the possibility for context-free corre­
spondence. As he proposed, the meaning of words (or sentences) is 
achieved through their use in the carrying out of various life forms. 
Such uses may be viewed as so many language games, each subject 
to its own particular rules. The precise boundaries of the rules can­
not be explicated, as the terms of explication will themselves be 
context (or “use”) dependent. “There are countless . . . different 
kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols,’ ‘words,’ ‘sentences.’ And this 
multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new 
types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into 
existence, and these become obsolete and get forgotten” (1963, 
11^). Essentially this means that any scientific term derives its 
meaning from its context of usage, which can also include the syn­
tactic conventions governing its use. To illustrate, in the case of 
psychology, a term like “aggression” derives its meaning from the 
many contexts in which it is employed. There are also many differ­
ent contexts of usage, thus giving the term a far different meaning 
depending on whether one is speaking about soldiers at war, tennis 
players, investment policies, woodchopping, or weed growth in the 
spring. To specify the conditions of use in any precise way is also 
problematic, as the terms of specification are themselves embedded 
in differing word games. In effect, anything said about aggression, 
or any other phenomenon, cannot be cut away from the historically 
situated context of concept usage.
Wittgenstein’s doubts concerning the capacity of language to 
render context-free description are extended in the work of Quine 
(1951, 1960). As Quine demonstrates, the attempt to define even a 
single word in terms of empirical referent is problematic. In partic-
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ular, the contexts in which single terms are employed are apt to be 
so many and varied that there is no strictly ostensive means of se­
curing word-object identities. The term “rabbit,” for example, may 
figure in many different linguistic, social, and environmental con­
texts. As a result, it is virtually impossible to determine through 
observation the truth value of propositions containing the term. 
There simply is no stimulus event (or class of events) to which the 
term is unambiguously wedded.
Concern with the contextual dependency of “what is true” has 
also reverberated throughout the social sciences. One of the most 
significant manifestations is reflected in the ethnomethodological 
movement (see especially Garfinkel 1967). As ethnomethodologists 
maintain, descriptive terms within both the sciences and everyday 
life are fundamentally indexical; that is, their meaning is free to 
vary across divergent contexts of usage. Descriptions index events 
within situations and are devoid of generalized meaning. The es­
sential defeasibility of descriptive terms is demonstrated by wide- 
ranging studies of how people go about determining in various 
situations what counts as a psychiatric problem or as suicide, juve­
nile crime, gender, states of mind, alcoholism, mental illness, or 
other putative constituents of the taken-for-granted world (see 
Garfinkel 1967; Atkinson 1977; Gicourel 1968; Kessler & McKen­
na 1978; Coulter 1979; McAndrew 1969; Scheff 1966).
When writ large, the contextualist arguments suggest that de­
scriptive and explanatory schemas within the sciences remain mute 
with respect to prediction and empirical evaluation until linked to 
referents. However, rules as to how such linkages are to be con­
structed are generally unexplicated (and indeed there are prin­
cipled impediments to establishing such rules). Thus descriptive 
and explanatory constructions are fundamentally free to vary in 
their empirical content or implications across context of usage. By 
extension, this is to say that any behavioral theory may in principle 
be applied to (used to describe or explain) virtually any human 
action. The constraints over such application lie chiefly within the 
social process through which contextual linkages are forged. Thus 
almost any theory (Freudian, Skinnerian, social learning, role-rule, 
cognitive) should be capable of absorbing all empirical outcomes so 
long as there are communities of scholars capable of negotiating 
the meaning of theoretical terms across divergent context.
The Social Construction of Reality 
In the preceding discussion, the semantic link between word and 
object was weakened by taking into account the contextual depen-
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dency of linking practices. A second threat to incorrigibility of 
meaning has been nurtured in different soil, namely, that of ra­
tionalist and idealist philosophy. Debate over the origin of abstract 
ideas has had a long and vigorous history. Empiricists such as 
Locke, Hume, and the Mills have argued, on the one hand, that 
such ideas are derived from sensory input, while on the other, ra­
tionalist/idealist thinkers such as Kant, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, 
and Nietzsche have demonstrated the manifold weaknesses in such 
a position. As they proposed in various ways, the mind functions as 
a generative source of ideas. In effect, the mind generates the con­
ceptual basis for interpreting and understanding (and some will 
argue, perceiving) the world. The implications of this latter posi­
tion for a theory of meaning, or semantic linkages, are far-reach­
ing. To the extent that the mind furnishes the categories of 
understanding, there are no real-world objects of study other than 
those inherent within the mental makeup of persons. There are no 
objects save those for which there are preceding categories. The 
result is that semantic linkages do not derive from a conjoining of 
independent realms—object and category—tied through linking 
definitions. Rather, in the act of comprehension, object and con­
cept are one; objects reduce to the mental a priori.
In the present century, this tradition has manifested itself in nu­
merous ways. Several are especially pertinent to our proceedings. 
First, within the philosophy of science, the reduction of object to 
percept occurs, though in muted form, in Kuhn’s influential work 
(1970). In his most radical moments, Kuhn raises serious doubts 
over the cumulativeness of scientific knowledge. Scientific anoma­
lies are not generally viewed by Kuhn as contradictions to the as­
sumptions of normal science. Rather, they are orthogonal to it. 
Thus when a new theory is articulated to render the anomalies 
coherent, this theory is not so much an improvement over the old 
as it is essentially a different theory, designed to account for differ­
ent data, to ask different questions. As Kuhn argues, scientific rev­
olutions are akin to “Gestalt shifts”; one simply sees the world 
through a different theoretical lens. Kuhn’s closet rationalism gives 
way to a more complete assault in Hanson’s widely credited Patterns 
of Discovery (1958). As Hanson proposes, what we take to be ele­
mentary facts (observables) are determined in significant degree by 
the conceptual systems we bring to bear upon them. Visual experi­
ence is a product of conceptual or theoretical invention.
The infant and the layman can see—they are not blind. But they
cannot see what the physicist sees; they are blind to what he sees.
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We may not hear that the oboe is out of tune, though this will be 
painfully obvious to the trained musician. . . . The element of the 
visitor’s visual field, though identical with those of the physicist, are 
not organized for him as for the physicist; the same lines, colours, 
shapes are apprehended by both, but not in the same way. (Hanson 
1958, 17)
Just as contextualism as a philosophic orientation is reflected in 
substantive inquiry.in the social sciences, the rationalist orientation 
has also manifested itself in a variety of important ways. Highly 
influential has been the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz 
(1962—66). As Schutz maintained, understanding of others is pred­
icated upon a system of preconceptualization: “I bring into each 
concrete situation a stock of preconstructed knowledge which in­
cludes networks of typifications of human individuals in general, 
typical human motivations, goals, and action patterns” (1964, 29). 
Thus the identification of others’ actions is essentially prefigured.
For Schutz, as well as for Kuhn and Hanson, the assumption is 
implicit but incompletely elaborated that such prefigurations are 
derived from social interchange. This assumption is a pivotal one 
in that it enables the thorny problem of innate ideas to be avoided. 
The view that people bring to situations cognitive sets, frameworks, 
or orientations that are genetically rather than environmentally in­
duced has had a long and rather unpleasant intellectual history. To 
lodge the frameworks of social understanding within social process 
largely insulates against the accumulated criticism. It is the social 
basis of the phenomenological fixing that comes to play a critical 
role in the broadly influential work of Berger and Luckmann 
(1966). As they reason, Schutz’s work forms the basis for a so­
ciology of knowledge concerned with the ways in which knowledge 
both emerges from and serves to order social process. The indi­
vidual “internalizes” the objective order and typically employs such 
internalized representations to recreate the social order.
This form of social constructionism is broadly apparent in re­
cent social psychological writings. For example, extending Schach- 
ter’s labeling theory of emotions (1964) in a sophisticated and 
compelling way is the work of Averill (1983) on the social construc­
tion of anger. Here anger is removed from psychology as an object 
of study. There is no independent process to be interrogated. 
Rather, there are historically contingent, culturally specific con­
structions of emotional worlds. In a similar vein, Sabini and Silver 
(1982) have discussed in piquant detail the ways by which people 
determine what counts in social life as envy, flirtation, anger, and
Kenneth J. Gergen
Correspondence versus Autonomy 143
the like. Inquiry has also been opened on the social functions of 
causal accounting in human affairs (Harre 1981; Lalljee 1981; 
Gergen & Gergen 1982). Mummendey and her colleagues (1982) 
have attempted to demonstrate how aggression is not a fact in 
nature but a label used by people for social purposes. Similar argu­
ments have been mounted in the case of the self (Gergen 1977). 
The implications of this orientation for science become more fully 
explicated in the work of Latour and Woolgar (1979) on the social 
construction of scientific facts. They undertake a close examination 
of the various social “microprocesses” through which biological re­
searchers attempt to generate incorrigible facts from manifest 
disorder.
As we see, although the intellectual origins differ, both the con- 
texualist and the constructionist reach similar conclusions. Social 
actions, as matters of common concern, owe their existence to the 
social process whereby meanings are generated and events indexed 
by these meanings. There are no independently identifiable, real- 
world referents to which the language of social description is 
cemented.
Deconstructionism and the Figurative Basis
OF Human Understanding
As we have seen, the contextualist approach emphasizes the situa­
tional dependence of meaning, while the constructionist emphasizes 
the social origins of meaning within situations. In both cases howev­
er, the deployment of a descriptive term is determined less by the 
features of the object, action, or event to be described than it is by 
extraneous processes. A third line of argument threatens the em­
pirical dependence of theoretical description in an entirely different 
way. Rather than directly challenging the connection between theo­
ry and event, the attempt has been to demonstrate how much what is 
communicated about events is determined, not by the character of 
events themselves, but by linguistic figures or forms. To the extent 
that description and explanation are dependent on such figures or 
forms, what science tells us about the “thing in itself’ is rendered 
suspect. Although the threat to the semantic link is thus an indirect 
one, the implications for correspondence assumptions are nev­
ertheless powerful.
To appreciate more fully the force of this line of argument, one 
must take into account the structuralist movement, to which de­
constructionism is largely a response. Structuralism as an intellec­
tual endeavor has largely been given to a dualistic conception of
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communicative acts, one that discriminates between surface actions 
and underlying meaning. Following Saussure’s distinction (1959) 
between the “signifier” (or word) and the “signified” (or the under­
lying concept the word represents), it is assumed that the sprawl­
ing, ephemeral, and variegated acts of communication may be 
expressions of more fundamental, structured sets of principles, di­
mensions, conceptual templates, or the like. A penetrating exam­
ination of the spoken or written word might thus reveal the more 
latent, possibly unconscious structure that lies beneath, structure 
that may serve as the ultimate basis for human understanding it­
self. In this view, for example, Levi-Strauss (1963) has proposed 
that wide-ranging cultural forms and artifacts can be traced to a 
fundamental binary logic. Chomsky (1968) has attempted to locate 
a “deep” grammatical structure from which all well-formed sen­
tences may be derived. Lacan’s persistent concern (1978) has been 
with the structural features of the layers of the mind.
In spite of the immense and optimistic challenge furnished by 
the structuralist movement, mounting criticism combined with the 
steady accumulation of competing accounts of the “hidden struc­
tures” have left the movement crippled. For one, the hermeneuti- 
cist writings of Gadamer (1975) and Ricoeur (1974) may be singled 
out for their debilitating implications. As argued by Gadamer, the 
interpretation of texts (i.e., the apprehension of underlying mean­
ing) is largely dependent on historically situated conventions. Thus 
what a text “means” can only be determined within the contempo­
rary “horizon of understanding.” Whether this understanding co­
incides with that of the initial author is essentially indeterminant. 
Although differing from Gadamer in important respects, Ricoeur 
echoes this concern in his argument that texts serve as means of 
“opening up” possible existences. Interpreting a person’s words is 
not a matter of determining with clarity their precise underlying 
structure. Rather, words have a social career that escapes the finite 
horizon lived by the writer. The critical implications of this line of 
reasoning for structuralist thought are clear enough: to the extent 
that interpretations of the “underlying realm” are dependent on 
historically based conventions, such interpretations give more in­
sight into contemporary practices of accounting than they do into 
underlying structure. Or, to put it another way, the constraints 
over what may be said about such underlying structures are not 
furnished by the structures themselves so much as they are by the 
acceptable practices of rendering interpretation.
These implications are amplified in the works of deconstruc-
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tionist writers such as Derrida (1977), Hartman (1975), and deMan 
(1979). Here the recurrent concern is with the literary figures 
(tropes, metaphors, and other rhetorical stratagems) that dominate 
the process of interpretation. If one chooses to interpret or de­
scribe, such interpretations must abide by the rules governing in­
terpretation itself. As certain literary forms are selected and others 
abandoned, not only will the resultant work (whether literary, phil­
osophic, or scientific) be delimited, but the object of interpretation 
will be deconstructed. Thus, in adopting a given literary form, the 
form itself comes to dominate description in a way that obliterates 
or masks from view the object of description. If one attempts to 
interpret the “underlying intention” of a given author (or actor), 
the literary form intrinsic to interpretation itself will obscure and 
replace the object of concern. In Derrida’s terms, “II n’y a pas de 
hors texte” (There is nothing outside the text). Or to bring the 
matter closer to home, behavioral description possesses an automy 
of its own. Once a descriptive form is adopted, it carries on an 
independent existence and the referential implications are ob­
scured. For example, to use the metaphor of the computer to “de­
scribe” mental functioning is to restrain the descriptive enterprise 
in significant ways. Concepts of creativity, imagination, and uncon­
scious cease to be matters of major concern. In effect, once the 
metaphor has been selected, the actual processes at stake are 
circumscribed. Whatever their properties, they will be replaced by 
constituents of the metaphor.
Behavioral scientists have increasingly come to share these con­
cerns with the figurative basis of theoretical-accounts (cf. Leary, in 
press; Sampson 1983). In particular, a keen interest has developed 
in recent years over the dominant metaphors guiding theoretical 
construction in psychology. Much of this discussion has been in­
spired by Pepper’s analysis (1972) of world hypotheses. Following 
Pepper, many analysts have criticized mainstream psychology of 
the present century for its virtually exclusive reliance on a mecha­
nistic metaphor (Hollis 1977; Shotter 1975). Such criticisms often 
revolve around issues of the value biases implicit in the metaphor. 
However, from the present perspective, we see that once a theorist 
is committed to the metaphor of the human as machine, the partic­
ular activities of the person cease to play a central role in the pro­
cess of theoretical description and explanation. Regardless of the 
character of the person’s behavior, the mechanist theorist is vir­
tually obliged to segment him from the environment, to view the 
environment in terms of stimulus or input elements, to view the
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person as reactive to and dependent on these input elements, to 
view the domain of the mental as structured (constituted of in­
teracting elements), to segment behavior into units that can be co­
ordinated to the stimulus inputs, and so on. Other metaphors exist 
as alternatives to the mechanistic. For example, the organismic, the 
marketplace, the dramaturgical, and the rule-following metaphors 
have all played a significant role in psychological research of the 
past decades (see Overton & Reese 1973; Thibaut & Kelley 1959; 
Sarbin & Scheibe 1983; and Harre & Secord 1972). Each carries 
with it certain advantages and limitations, each commits itself to 
certain value positions, and, most important for present purposes, 
each acts so as to imply an ontology. Once the terms of this on­
tology are explicated, the precise actions of the individual so “de­
scribed” cease to be significant. They primarily serve to set the 
context for exercising the favored metaphor.
From Action to Linguistic Autonomy 
Although thinkers in the deconstructionist vein furnish an indirect 
threat to assumptions of semantic mapping, one final line of argu­
ment must be considered. In this case, a principled challenge is 
launched more directly against the relationship between word and 
entity. To appreciate the force of this challenge, we must turn the 
clock back to late nineteenth-century Germany and the intense de­
bate over the character of the specifically human sciences {Geisten- 
wissenschaften) as opposed to the natural sciences {Naturwissenschaf- 
ten). Dilthey, Weber, Rickert, and many others argued that the 
study of human behavior was centrally concerned, not with the ob­
jectivity given behavior of persons, but with the underlying mean­
ing of behavior to persons. The understanding of human conduct 
thus required a penetration into the subjective life of individuals, 
into their intentions, motives, and reasons. A similar line of argu­
ment was later adopted by Collingwood in his characterization of 
historical study: “Unlike the natural scientist, the historian is not 
concerned with events as such at all. He is concerned with those 
events which are the outward expression of thoughts and is only 
concerned with these so far as they express throughts” (1946, 217). 
Peter Winch’s influential The Idea of a Social Science (1958) elabo­
rates further on this thesis. As Winch maintains, the objects of nat­
ural science study have an existence independent of the concepts 
used to understand them. However, in the case of human action, 
the concepts of understanding essentially establish the ontological 
foundations. For example, the occurrence of something that we
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term “claps of thunder” is independent of the concept of thunder; 
however, in the case of human action, without a concept of “com­
mand” or “obedience,” such “events” simply do not exist.
This thinking wends its way into contemporary study in the 
form of antibehaviorist thinking. Most important in this instance, 
Charles Taylor (1964), among others, has distinguished between 
human behavior (bodily movements caused by forces or elements 
over which the individual has no control) and human action (move­
ments of the body resulting from intentionality or reasons). 
Human study, on this account, is not principally concerned with 
the former (such as the velocity of a free-falling human body), but 
is vitally absorbed with the latter. The understanding of human 
action requires that one take into account the precipitating reasons 
(motives, intentions), and most of our terms for describing human 
conduct are essentially wedded to the assumption of underlying 
reasons or intentions. That is, when an individual is described as 
aggressive, the assumption follows that he or she must have 
intended to be so. If one had no such intention, then the descriptor 
would simply be inappropriate. In the same way, the logic of our 
language does not permit us to say that one “reads a book,” “writes 
a speech,” “takes a plane to Chicago,” or even “criticizes others” 
without any intention of doing so. In effect, the common language 
is a language of reasons rather than causes.
The argument that the language for describing human conduct 
is largely an intentional one is broadly compelling. A rationale for 
why such language is required is spelled out elsewhere (Gergen 
1982). However, in the present context, we must inquire into the 
implications of this view for the problem of semantic linkages. Es­
sentially we find ourselves in the following condition: The lan­
guage of person description is not linked to, defined by, nor does it 
refer to spatiotemporal particulars as such. Rather, its referents 
seem largely to be psychological conditions (intentions, meanings, 
motives, etc.). When we speak of a person being aggressive, help­
ful, obedient, conforming, and the like, we are speaking, not of the 
overt movements of the body, but of psychic dispositions. Yet if this 
conclusion is accepted, we then confront the problem of grounding 
the semantic linkage between person description and psychological 
state. How is one to recognize the occurrence of one form of inten­
tion or motive as opposed to another?
A variety of answers to this question have been posed over the 
centuries, and there is simply not space and time enough for a 
review of these proposals and their difficulties. However, that
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there are difficulties has become most apparent in recent her­
meneutic debate. The problem is generally cast in terms of ac­
curacy of interpretation. When confronted with competing 
accounts of the interpretation of a text, how are judgments to be 
rendered regarding relative accuracy? How can one interpretation 
be judged as “missing the author’s point” (meaning, intention) and 
another deemed accurate? Again, attempts have been made to an­
swer this question positively (Habermas 1983; Hirsch 1967), but 
none of these arguments has yet commanded broad agreement. 
Furthermore, the specter of cultural and historical relativism re­
mains robust. We have already touched on the work of Gadamer 
and Ricoeur in this respect.
In my view, there are principled reasons for indeterminacy of 
interpretation. In particular, it appears that all attempts to clarify 
or determine with accuracy the intent of a given action are subject 
to infinite regression. As we have seen, behaviors are indexed by 
intentional language (e.g., aggression, dominance, helpfulness). In 
effect, the label commits one to assumptions about a psychological 
state that is not itself made transparent by the movements of the 
body. If clarification is then desired concerning the actual motive 
or intention, we must rely on other behavioral indicators (e.g., ut­
terances, movements). Yet the description of these indicators is 
subject to the same problem as the initial interpretation; the de­
scriptor commits one to still further assumptions about psychologi­
cal dispositions. For example, interpreting a given action (e.g., 
delivering shock to another subject) as aggression, is in itself with­
out objective warrant. The experimenter does not truly know what 
the subject was intending when he pressed his fingers on the but­
ton. For clarification, the subject might then be asked what he was 
“trying” to do. Yet his utterance (e.g., “He had it coming”) itself 
stands in need of interpretation (are these words expressing anger, 
moral duty, a need for reciprocation, a need to fulfill the experi­
menter’s expectation?). Whatever conclusion is drawn rests on the 
same quicksand as the initial interpretation. It commits one to yet 
another objectively unwarranted conclusion, as would all further 
attempts to clarify or “shed further light” through observation.
This analysis leaves us confronting the possibility that the lan­
guage of person description (and explanation) is generated, elabo­
rated, extended, or cast aside in relative independence of the 
activities it is designed to describe. In principle, its life is essentially 
autonomous from and orthogonal to the life for which it accounts. 
This is not to say that we cannot reach agreement (even rapidly) 
regarding the adequacy of behavioral description. Rather, it is to
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venture that adequacy in description is not engendered by the 
character of the acts in question but by the exigencies of social prac­
tice. For example, we may readily agree that a person is “dominat­
ing a conversation,” but with the proper negotiation of terms, the 
same actions could be viewed as “submissive,” “loving,” “inquir­
ing,” “lazy,” and so on. The necessity of shifting from one descrip­
tion to another does not derive from the character of the actions 
themselves; the actions are identical across descriptions. Rather, 
they depend on the skills or abilities of the interlocutors to navigate 
successfully the existing language conventions.
Given the relative autonomy of descriptive activity, the way is 
open for considering the origins, forms, potentials, and per­
vasiveness of accounting practices. In effect, one is sensitized to the 
possibilities for ethnographic analyses of person description (eth- 
nopsychology, ethnosociology, etc.) with reflexive ramifications for 
the relevant disciplines. Such work is already well underway in an­
thropology and cross-cultural psychology. Analyses have focused, 
not only on the particular system of psychological description in 
various primitive cultures (Heelas & Lock 1981; Lutz 1982), but as 
well on potential generalities across cultures (cf. Shweder & 
Bourne 1982; White 1980). The implications of such work also play 
a critically reflexive role for the behavioral scientist. For example, 
concerted inquiry has demonstrated how common linguistic con­
ventions can serve to fashion what are taken to be scientific facts 
about personality (Shweder & D’Andrade 1980; Shweder 1982). Of 
more general significance, recent attempts have been made toward 
systematizing the common-sense suppositions upon which all such 
knowledge must be grounded if one is to “make sense” (and not 
“nonsense”) within contemporary Western culture. In this regard, 
Smedslund (1978) has attempted to isolate common-sense the­
orems that underlie psychological theories such as social learning 
theory. Ossorio (1978) has outlined a discrete set of parameters 
that appear to guide the description of persons. My own attempt 
(Gergen 1984) has been to demonstrate that virtually all that may 
be said about a given activity (e.g., “aggression”) is already given in 
the linguistic rules governing the terms in question. Through a 
procedural unpacking process, it is possible to elucidate the gram­
matical scaffolding.
Descriptive Language: Constrained and Free 
This analysis has explored four contemporary threats to the kinds 
of dependencies on semantic languages required for a progressive, 
empirically based science. Let us consider their implications for the
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possibility of observational constraints over description and then 
move to examine the implications for the future of the sociobe- 
havioral sciences.
The contextualist arguments hold that descriptions of the world 
are in themselves uninformative about the nature of things. Such 
descriptions may be constrained by observation, but a continuous 
process of ostensive grounding is necessitated as environmental 
and linguistic circumstances are altered. The same descriptive term 
may have multiple referents (or none at all) depending on what 
language game one is playing at a given time. So long as one is 
committed to a particular game, then, a certain degree of con­
straint or “objective meaning” is possible. From the scientific per­
spective, observation may thus play an important role in the 
constraining of theory; however, its constraining power is lodged 
within social process. Within particular scientific subcultures at spe­
cific periods, localized agreement over concept application (“what 
counts as what”) can be reached, and this does seem to be the case 
for most natural science explanation (see Campbell, chap. 5, this 
volume, for a discussion of the social processes generating such 
agreements).
From the constructionist vantage point, we find that descriptive 
languages are not derived from observation; rather, such lan­
guages operate as the lenses or filters through which we determine 
what counts as an object. As argued, it is problematic to extend the 
metaphor of the lens to the domain of perception. The argument 
that language determines the way events are registered on the 
senses is badly flawed. It seems more promising to argue that the 
forestructure of the descriptive language will have a strong deter­
mining effect on the account to be rendered of the world. What­
ever one’s observations, they must be recreated within the sense­
making devices at our disposal. Thus it is not the observation that 
produces the chief constraint over description; it is the form of 
descriptive discourse itself that constrains. The origins of these 
forms may, again, be traced to the sphere of social interchange. Is 
this to obviate fully the process of systematic observation within the 
sciences? It would not appear so. So long as it is possible for scien­
tists to agree on how to employ the filter or the lens in a given 
setting, then it should be possible for observed variations to correct 
or sustain a given theory. If what we term measures of “the earth’s 
rotation” were to undergo rapid change, certain questions would 
undoubtedly be raised concerning current astronomical theorizing. 
The conventions of discourse might determine how sense was
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made. Nevertheless, the constructed events could then stand as a 
goad to theoretical activity.
Much the same result emerges when we take into account the 
deconstructionist orientation. Here it may be argued that scientific 
description is strongly infiuenced by the linguistic figures (meta­
phors, tropes, etc.) selected for communication. Once the figure 
has been selected (and it is unclear how such determination could 
be induced from observation), certain descriptive practices are vir­
tually required. The language itself functions continuously without 
dependence on the particulars of the world to be described. Yet 
observational constraint can be secured in much the same way as in 
the contextualist and constructionist cases. Localized social agree­
ments can be reached regarding the proper metaphor or other lit­
erary figure to apply to certain observable events. Once such 
semantic linkages are conventionalized, then observation may in­
form one as to when the figure is relevant, correct, or inaccurate, 
and when it is not. In the same way, mathematical systems possess 
their own internal logic; yet once agreement is reached over how 
various mathematical integers index various observables (e.g., what 
counts as “three” as opposed to “four” entities), there may be little 
subsequent ambiguity over applying this system to events. For all of 
these arguments, then, we may surely agree with Quine’s conten­
tion that scientific theory is grossly underdetermined with respect 
to observation; and we may agree with Kuhn that what we term 
advances in science are highly dependent on social negotiation 
practices among scientists. Yet when lodged within certain social 
practices, empirical observations do retain at least the capacity to 
constrain theoretical description.
It is the fourth line of argument, which stresses the language of 
action, that poses the most radical challenge to traditional corre­
spondence views. In this case, we find that terms of behavioral de­
scription cannot in principle be linked in a definitional sense to 
observed patterns of human activity. By and large, the language of 
human action simply has no recognizable spatiotemporal coordi­
nates. Nor, given the practical obstacles to cementing static, lin­
guistic integers to an ever-changing pattern, does such an outcome 
seem possible. Theoretical description and explanation may thus 
proceed in relative independence of behavioral observation. This 
latter threat to semantic linkage may also demarcate the study of 
human action from the study of many natural phenomena. Al­
though language conventions in both domains enjoy far greater 
autonomy than suggested by early correspondence enthusiasts, it
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does seem possible through social practice to link language and 
observation in the natural science case in a way that does not seem 
possible in the case of human action.
As we thus see, traditional empiricist and postempiricist ac­
counts of behavioral science practices are placed in severe jeopar­
dy. The present arguments suggest that the assiduous application 
of empirical method, combined with sophisticated logic, will not 
yield the kind of knowledge of human affairs optimistically prom­
ised in various logical empiricist (and critical rationalist) writings. 
Such systems of understanding would not appear to be derived 
from, guided by, or ultimately corrected by the world of observa­
tion. They seem quintessentially products of human interaction— 
communal artifacts, the major functions of which must be traced to 
their function within a social process. For the traditional empiricist 
or the security-seeking scientist, such conclusions will be found pes­
simistic, even nihilistic. However, they are so only if one remains 
glued to past conceptions of the scientific enterprise. When prop­
erly extended, this line of argument suggests that the potential of 
sociobehavioral study has scarcely been tapped. This study may be 
of enormous consequence to society, but traditional scientific prac­
tices of the craft have virtually ensured that its potential will not be 
realized.
Whither the Science of Human Action?
To appreciate the unrealized potential of behavioral inquiry, it is 
useful to return to Austin’s concept of performative utterances 
(1962), that is, utterances that do not describe or report anything 
about the world, that can neither be verified or falsified, but that 
themselves constitute significant forms of social action. For exam­
ple, utterances such as “I vow,” “I promise,” or “I am obligated” 
are not reports on real-world states of affairs. However, they often 
play an immensely important role in social affairs. In a major sense, 
the forms of theoretical description and understanding generated 
within the sociobehavioral sciences may be considered per­
formative in character. They appear to describe events in the real 
world, but closer examination reveals no spatiotemporal coordi­
nates. Nevertheless, such descriptions are integral to the broader 
social process in which the sciences are embedded. Scientific expla­
nations and descriptions serve in the same way as “vows,” “prom­
ises,” and other performatives. They operate as actions with 
significant social consequences. Again in Austin’s terms, they carry 
with them a considerable degree of “illocutionary force,” that is.
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the capacity to invoke patterns of social action. We must, then, con­
sider the performative uses to which language is put within the 
culture. As the inventors, purveyors, and elaborators of lan­
guage—and specifically, languages about people—the sociobe- 
havioral scientists can serve a critical role within the culture, both 
intellectual and societal. Three of these functions deserve special 
attention. In each case, we will consider the implications for the 
field of mental health, a focal domain throughout this volume.
Societal Reproduction and Transformation 
For human populations, language constitutes perhaps the major 
form of communal or coordinated social action. When people are 
actively engaged in linguistic interchange, they are carrying out 
intricate interdependent activities—much like dancing or fencing. 
Further, because language is used to “describe” or explain people’s 
internal states (e.g., intentions, affects, plans), it is a major vehicle 
of social influence. The description of a people’s internal states 
may dramatically alter others’ actions toward them—including the 
giving and taking of life. To attribute a person’s failure to his “mo­
tivation” has far different implications than pointing to his lack of 
genetic endowment; to attribute achievement to motives of self- 
aggrandizement is to imply a different treatment of the actor than 
to see such achievement as an act of altruism; to say that a killing 
was accompanied by “malice aforethought” is to threaten the ac­
tor’s life in a way that an attribution of temporary insanity would 
not. As language users with a high degree of visibility in the 
culture, sociobehavioral scientists are positioned to have enormous 
influence on the dominant theories of society and thus on its social 
patterns and institutions.
In recent years, critics of the science have become increasingly 
concerned over such influences. As they have pointed out, the sci­
ences treat their descriptions and explanations as if they were neu­
tral accounts of the facts. Yet they are far from neutral in their 
effects. As Gouldner (1970) has shown, for example, structural- 
functional theory in sociology serves to maintain the existing state 
of society’s major institutions. It favors the status quo and militates 
against revolution. Social change agents are, within its framework, 
to be distrusted. Similarly, mechanistic accounts of human activity, 
because of the emphasis placed on manipulation of environmental 
stimuli, tend to favor those who have the power in society to control 
these stimuli (Argyris 1975). Most psychological theory, with its ex­
planatory focus on the internal workings of mind, places the blame
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for undesirable actions (crime, unemployment, drug consumption) 
on the individual. Theories holding “principled decision making” 
superior in moral matters implicitly favor a male-dominated 
culture (Gilligan 1982). Women, as it is said, prefer a more con­
textually based form of moral decision making. Many additional 
examples could be supplied.
Most existing analyses of the implicit value biases of scientific 
theory have taken the scientist to task for such biases. The scientist 
is criticized for masking “ought” statements, or visions of the good, 
behind seemingly neutral descriptions. My arguments do not de­
tract from the importance of these attacks. However, it is also clear 
that the theorists who are attacked are not misguided in their ex­
pression of value commitments. They can do little else. If they can 
be blamed at all, it is perhaps for their failure to appreciate the 
significance of such commitments. Rather than searching for 
means of cleansing scientific discourse from prescriptive implica­
tion (which itself would act as a process of mystification), scientists 
should seek to gain as much sophistication as possible regarding 
the forms of descriptive and explanatory discourse that will best 
enable them to achieve their valued goals for society. They should 
improve their skills in creating “images of the good” rather than 
seeking escape.
The present arguments also give special importance to the sci­
ences as forces for societal transformation. Not only can the under­
standings developed and disseminated by the sciences re-create (or 
destroy) social organization, they may also help to transform that 
organization. For example, implicit in each of the above critiques is 
a vision of alternative social arrangements (change as opposed to 
the status quo, a redistribution of power, communal institutions, 
etc.). These implicit commitments carry the same prescriptive sig­
nificance as the theories under attack. To attack a theory for its 
support of the status quo is to favor forms of change. To criticize 
forms of explanation for their bias toward person-blame is to si­
multaneously suggest that systems, not persons, are generic causes. 
However, it also seems clear that criticism of existing understand­
ings is only one means of using the science to transform the 
culture. Theories may insinuate themselves into social life in other 
ways as well. For one, various social groups whom scientists believe 
to be disenfranchised or oppressed may require the kinds of lan­
guage forms that would give them a sense of unity and rationale 
for collective action. It is this sort of theoretical work in which 
Marxist theorists have often excelled and that today has galvanzied
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the feminist movement into a vital social force. In addition to cri­
tique and the articulation of rationales, the scientists may also per­
ceive a need for theoretical accounts that can favor certain forms of 
institution more generally. For example, critics may be justified in 
attacking the individualistic bias of psychological theory. However, 
there remains the difficult task of creating descriptive and explana­
tory forms that would render communitarianism both intelligible 
and desirable.
What implications does this line of reasoning have for inquiry 
into mental health? At the outset, it is clear that prevailing theories 
of mental illness and health have been of enormous social conse­
quence within the culture. The incarceration of non-normal per­
sons within this country has depended in large measure on the 
pervasive ethnopsychology. That is, if the non-normal are viewed 
as “ill,” “unreasonable,” “controlled by unconscious and uncon­
trollable forces,” then locked wards seem reasonable. If the same 
symptoms are explained in terms of normal psychological fu*nc- 
tioning, reasonable and functional within their context and under 
voluntary and socially accessible control, then forced segregation is 
injurious if not immoral. In most cases, theories of mental or emo­
tional well-being are transparent prescriptions for the good life. 
However, theorists in this domain seldom seem self-reflexive in 
these pronouncements. Images of the good are made to appear as 
by-products of careful empirical inquiry. In this sense, almost all 
such accounts are not only designed to mystify, but they lack 
thoughtful appraisal of the potential assets and liabilities of the 
kinds of ideal types championed by the theories. An important goal 
for future theoretical work in the mental health arena is the devel­
opment of probing rationale for the kinds of action patterns and 
social institutions that may be achieved through favored theoretical 
positions.
Critique and the Transcendence of Ontology 
Mention has been made of the use of critique within the sciences 
for purposes of social transformation. However, there is a second 
and less ideologically restricted sense in which critique should come 
to occupy a central role within the sciences. In this case, critique 
serves as a major means of escaping the strangulating effects of 
one-dimensional ontologies. As we have seen, descriptions of per­
sons may be elaborated, extended, or abandoned without regard to 
the actual activity of persons to which they have putative reference. 
Yet despite its lack of spatiotemporal coordinates, the language is
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deployed as a referential device. As the descriptive language is put 
into action, the interlocutors make an implicit commitment to a 
world of events that is independent of the language. Simultaneous 
to language use is its objectification; an ontology of intangibles is 
created. As an inadvertent by-product of communication, a power­
ful world of impalpable particulars springs to life.
Required, then, is a process whereby the science can continu­
ously demystify the realities it serves to create. The scientist is invit­
ed to carry out the kind of intellectual work that will enable the 
culture to transcend the pervasive ontology of the time, to reach 
beyond and to appreciate both the advantages and shortcomings of 
the dominant world view. As Stolzenberg has proposed in the case 
of mathematics, “We need to adopt an activist policy concerning 
the invention and following of procedures that entail the undoing 
of accepted beliefs and habits of thought; and we ought to regard 
the invention of such procedures as one of the fundamental means 
by which scientific knowledge may be increased” (1978, 229). The 
process of person description seems virtually inevitable; indeed 
such description serves many valuable functions in social life. As we 
have seen, the scientist can enrich and potentiate that language. 
However, because any tool constrains as it liberates, the scientist 
seems optimally positioned to monitor, critique, and cast necessary 
doubt on the use of his own implements.
Within the mental health domain, this kind of critique has de­
manded a certain degree of attention. Particularly in regard to psy­
chotherapeutic aims and techniques, a keen, self-conscious attitude 
has developed. Much less has been done to monitor the hidden 
agendas underlying diagnostic, mensurational, and experimental 
psychopathology research programs. What does the most recent 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychi­
atric Association (DSM-3) tell us about contemporary culture and the 
valuational commitments of its authors? What social patterns are 
favored by tests that place a strong value on believing one controls 
one’s own outcomes, living under low stress, or being cognitively 
differentiated? If research results are interpreted in such a way 
that biological as opposed to cognitive processes are held primarily 
responsible for schizophrenia, what are the likely repercussions for 
institutions of family, school, and treatment centers? Such analyses 
should become a normal part of the research process, ideally pre­
ceding rather than following the mounting of large-scale research 
programs.
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Enhancing Symbolic Resources
One may justifiably lament the loss of security implicit in this analy­
sis. The belief that theoretical systems may be corrected through 
observation has been a long-standing source of optimism in the 
sociobehavioral sciences. Yet I do not simultaneously disparage the 
companionate conception of scientific progress. Advancement in 
the understanding of human conduct, not only is a possibility with­
in the present framework, but may indeed be considered a central 
concern of scientific work. Such progress derives from the develop­
ment and elaboration of conceptual systems. In their performative 
capacity, concepts of human conduct operate much as tools for car­
rying out relationships. Any given set of tools both enables and 
constrains. It facilitates certain lines of action while restricting oth­
ers. Advancement in understanding largely derives, then, from the 
development of new forms of discourse. With the emergence of 
new language frames, the potential for effective human action is 
augmented. To view social life as an exchange of reinforcements is 
both fascinating and rich in evocative potential—but ultimately de­
limited. Greater efficacy can be achieved if one has at one’s disposal 
lenses through which social life may be seen as sets of rituals, the­
atrical presentations, economically determined patterns, power dy­
namics, dialectic transformations, and so on. In effect, the socio­
behavioral sciences stand in an optimal position to contribute to the 
symbolic resources of the culture.
This contribution may be best served by what I have termed 
“generative theory,’’ that is, theoretical views that are lodged 
against or contradict the taken-for-granted world of daily life 
(whether within the sciences or without) .and that open new vistas 
of intelligibility (Gergen 1978b). As any given theoretical system is 
elaborated and its general intelligiblity is increased, it becomes ob­
jectified. It acquires the mystique of real-world representation. 
The invitation to sustain such common-sense formulations is vir­
tually irresistable; failure to do so risks ridicule and social isolation. 
Yet it is just this mantle of apparent madness that must be donned 
if conceptual progress is to be achieved. In effect, some of the 
greatest conceptual strides are to be made when the theorist can 
bracket the accepted realities and fumble toward the articulation of 
the absurd. It is precisely this capacity that elevates the work of 
such theorists as Freud, Jung, Skinner, and Goffman. Each has 
succeeded, in varying degrees, to make uncommon sense.
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In terms of future inquiry in the mental health domain, a special 
premium is to be placed on such generative theorizing. For exam­
ple, the most popular theories of depression today trace its roots to 
environmental causes (e.g., uncontrollable circumstances and es­
teem-lowering communications). In this sense, depression appears 
to be an inescapable, innately determined reaction to particular 
events in the world. Such theories feed the common belief that 
people are victims of depression much as they are victims of war or 
earthquakes. A generative theory in this case might be one that 
reframed depression as a voluntary act over which people could 
exert control if they so desired. Rather than a society of victims, 
one might thus help to create a culture in which depressions were 
voluntarily used (or not) by people to serve their ends. Many other 
forms of “mental illness” are similar to depression in their mecha­
nistic structures and are equally ripe for unseating. (See Shweder’s 
essay, chap. 7 this volume, for further discussion of mental health 
theory and the creation of culture.)
The status of empirical work in the development of fundamen­
tal understanding is clearly diminished by this account. Rather 
than furnishing a warrant for theoretical statements, as traditional 
science would have it, such work largely serves a rhetorical func­
tion. It becomes a means for enhancing the objectification process. 
In particular, it enables the scientist to translate the abstract and 
typically rarefied language of the theoretical account into a more 
general or lay language (the language of methodology and scien­
tific procedure) and thereby increase the intelligibility of the for­
mer. Research thus continues to serve an important function, but 
one that is quite secondary to the development of symbolic re­
sources. There are other than rhetorical functions for empirical 
research. Particularly in the field of mental health, there may be a 
special need for certain kinds of actuarial prediction. Ascertaining 
the number of persons seeking therapeutic help, using heavy 
amounts of debilitating drugs, taking their lives, seeking divorce, 
experiencing rape or physical abuse, and so on, along with studies 
of major predictors, could do much to improve mental health pol­
icies and services. The attempt in this case is, not the objectification 
of theory, but merely the kind of counting and prediction that 
makes for more effective utilization of physical resources.
Summary
This chapter attempted, first, to examine several lines of argument 
that together pose a major threat to the belief that precise linkages
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can be forged between theories and evidence, propositions and 
particulars, or words and things. This analysis suggests that what­
ever the relation between these domains, it is both ambiguous and 
dependent on social convention. Further, in the case of describing 
human action, we confront the possibility that theory is fundamen­
tally closed to empirical evaluation. Within this context, we then 
examined the possibilities for a positive program in the social sci­
ences. It was proposed that the sciences chiefly be viewed as sources 
of intelligibility or vehicles for the conceptual construction of real­
ity. From this vantage point, the sciences can play a pivotal role in 
transforming or sustaining patterns of social conduct. Further, 
there is a critical need for conceptual work that can enable people 
to transcend or escape the taken-for-granted realities in which they 
are often enmeshed. In effect, the social sciences can make an im­
measurable contribution to the symbolic resources of the culture. 
This is a challenge that traditional empiricist epistemology has 
largely obscured; it is also a challenge of immense and exciting 
proportion.
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